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Electricity is the bloodstream of modern economic life, and most of us take it for granted
that we can rely on a steady supply. Yet, 1.3 billion people live without electricity. Brian
Min’s new book provides important new insights into why this is so and, in the process,
takes empirical work on distributive politics to new heights.
Electrification is often viewed as a public good that delivers nonexcludable and nonrival
benefits to a society. At closer inspection, the reality is very different: who gets connected
to the grid, when and with what degree of reliability are choices that in many societies
are wide open to political manipulation. As Min puts it, “public goods schemes may
offer universal benefits to a country as a whole, but in their implementation and delivery,
the individual fragments that make up these schemes have many of the characteristics of
private goods” (5). This combination of public and private good characteristics makes
electricity schemes more attractive to democratically elected politicians than to autocrats
who, arguably, are less concerned with the targeting of services.
The book’s main argument is that democratic governments provide greater access to
valuable public services such as electricity than non-democratic rulers because the logic of
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competitive elections forces them to do so. It also argues that competitive elections induce
governments to target electricity supply to the poor. These arguments are fairly convinc-
ing at the theoretical level, although coining the term “political externality” defined as
“non-monetary rewards that accrue to the political figures who broker the implementation
of public goods schemes” (21) to describe this process is somewhat unhelpful. The term
externality conjures up an image of benefits and costs that are unintentionally bestowed
on others. Here, the point appears more to be that the benefits of providing electricity
services are, in fact, internalized by electorally motivated politicians.
This general theory delivers three testable hypotheses. First, the electrification rate
(the fraction of the population with access to electricity) is higher in democracies than in
non-democracies. Second, the electrification rate is higher in poor areas in democracies
than in similar areas in non-democracies. Third, the effort to target electricity in a
democracy is maximum in election years.
Testing these hypotheses is harder than one might think, as comprehensive, consistent,
and reliable data on electrification are scarce on the ground. Min’s ingenious solution
is to use nighttime light output recorded from space by the US government’s Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System and made available in
digitalized format on a high spatial resolution (30 arc seconds or about 1 square kilometer
at the equator) on a yearly frequency between 1992 and 2010. The data have been
subjected to “ground truthing” and found to be accurate. The data’s great advantage is
that they can be spatially aggregated in any way you like.
Min estimates electrification rates by comparing nighttime light output at the 30 arc
seconds resolution to population numbers within this grid (unfortunately, recorded only
for a single year) and by assuming that unlit cells with a population similar to that of
the most dimly lit cells do not have access to electricity. Thus armed with “big data,”
Min provides affirmative answers to the three hypotheses. First, he documents, using
regression and matching techniques, that in a country with a long history of democracy
10% more citizens got electricity relative to a comparable country with a long history of
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non-democracy. Second, he aggregates the 30 arc second cells up to 100-kilometer by 100-
kilometer areas and matches these with data on infant mortality and economic output.
By comparing “poor areas” with low economic output and/or high infant mortality in
democracies and non-democracies, he documents that democracies are better at bringing
electricity to the poor.
These findings are important contributions to the literature on distributive politics.
They suggest that democracies not only serve the median citizen but also effectively
serve the poor and disadvantaged. However, given the cross-sectional nature of the data,
one can quibble about causality. Matching techniques help but still require “selection on
observables.” Yet, such quibbles should not overshadow the fact that it is a very significant
achievement to marshal the required data and to provide suggestive new insights into the
link between regime type and provision of public services. Perhaps the most interesting
analysis of the book relates to the third hypothesis. Here, Min zooms in on the Indian
state of Uttar Pradesh. This is a place where whom to cut off from the grid, when, and
for how long are political decisions. The most telling evidence comes from an analysis
of the nighttime light output from election districts before and after the 2002 election.
The election saw a dramatic transfer of power from one party to another. Lo and behold,
districts represented by the losing party appear much “darker” after than before while
those represented by the winner are lit up!
Power and the Vote is an important book that deserves to be widely read. In it,
Min demonstrates how “big data” originating from satellite pictures of earth at night
can facilitate inquiry into the politics of public goods provision at many different levels
imposed by spatial aggregation. The great virtue of this approach is that it avoids the
straitjacket of standard data, which are recorded for fixed geographical boundaries. In
this regard, the book is an example to follow. In addition, the specific questions Min asks
are at the heart of political economy. The collage of evidence he presents shows fairly
convincingly that democracy does bring benefits to the people. Finally, the book makes
a very valid conceptual point: the standard economic distinction between (pure) public
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goods, club goods, and private goods becomes blurred in the translation from theory
to empirical measurement. Min’s analysis demonstrates clearly that what at first may
appear to be a public good is, in fact, highly targetable, and that makes a difference,
particularly so in democracies.
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